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OMNISCIENCE AND ETERNITY: 
A REPLY TO CRAIG 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig 
William Craig presents an argument against those who maintain that there 
is no contradiction between being eternal and being omniscient. One of his 
targets is my own account of how an eternal God can be omniscient. Craig 
claims that my treatment of temporal indexicals such as 'now' is inade-
quate, and that my theory gives no general account of tense. Craig's argu-
ment misunderstands the theory of indexicals I give, and I show how to 
extend the theory to give a general account of tense. 
William Craig presents a limited argument against those who maintain 
that there is no contradiction between being eternal and being omniscient. 
The argument concerns what he terms "tensed facts," facts concerning 
what McTaggart called the A-series regarding time. McTaggart distin-
guished the A-series regarding time, which has to do with temporal 
becoming and the classification of events in terms of past, present, and 
future, from the B-series, which concerns only the relations of simultaneity, 
before, and after among events. A B-theorist regarding time and tense 
maintains that all facts regarding the A-series can be reduced to facts 
regarding the B-series; an A-theorist maintains that the reduction goes in 
the opposite direction. 
Craig's argument is not meant to attack B-theorists, but is rather aimed 
at the remainder who still think it is possible for an eternal God to know 
all truths. Craig's worry is about claims that report what is happening 
now, worrying that a being has to be in time in order to know what is 
happening now. 
One of his targets is my own account of how an eternal God can be 
omniscient. There are two parts to his argument. First, Craig objects to 
my treatment of claims involving temporal indexicals, such as 'now'. 
Second, he objects that my account is incomplete, since there is much 
more to the topic of tense than is covered by a theory of temporal indexi-
cals. I will focus most of my attention on the first objection, and briefly 
show at the end of this paper how to extend my account to handle tense 
more generally. 
Regarding my view of temporal indexicals, Craig's objection concerns 
the two propositions 
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(1) It is now 1 June 1984 
and 
(lA) The eSSe1lce of the moment picked out by the lise of the demon-
strative 'now' in (1) is mutually exemplified with the property of 
being 1 June 1984. 
He says, 
It is odd that Kvanvig refers to his (1) as a proposition, for on his own 
view propositions lack indexicality. Rather (1) is a sentence, and the 
question is whether the proposition expressed by (1) is infected by 
temporality, that is to say, whether that proposition is such that it 
cannot be expressed "without implying temporal indexicals." 
Kvanvig's claim is that the propositional content of (1) can be 
expressed by sentences not implying temporal indexicals. His reason 
for this claim is that (lA) is not so infected ... and, moreover, con-
tains all the same temporal elements as (1). But (lA) is true only if the 
"is" in (lA) is tenseless. Otherwise (lA) is false, having been true 
only on 1 June 1984. If (1 A) is tensed, the time of its truth is just the 
same as that of (1). Thus K vanvig errs when he says that if (lA) is not 
identical to (1) it is not because of some temporal element...' 
Confusion abounds here, and it is partly my fault, for in formulating (lA) 
above, I referred to the word 'now' in (1), and that confuses the distinction 
between (1), a proposition, and the sentence 
(Sl) 'Tt is now 1 June 1984'. 
To remove this misleading element, we can reformulate (lA) as 
(lA') The eSSe1lce of the moment picked out by the use of the demon-
strative 'now' in (S1) is mutually exemplified with the property of 
being 11une 1984. 
This change does not remove all the confusions, however, and my goal 
here is to remove the confusions and show that Craig's argument is not 
successful against the kind of theory I hold. I will outline the theory in 
question, and then return to Craig's argument above. 
My account of the compatibility of eternity and omniscience has nothing 
to do with tensed facts or with anything McTaggartian, except that I refuse 
to endorse a B-theory about time. In fact, one of the confusions that T think 
we need to eliminate is to quit talking about things like "tensed facts". 
Tense is a property of sentences, not facts. Furthermore, on the theory I 
hold, propositions are the objects of knowledge, so if (1) above is some-
thing that can be known, it has to be a proposition. Craig thinks I must 
take it to be a sentence, but neither it nor (lA) can be taken to be sentences 
and still be objects of knowledge. Hence, when Craig inquires about the 
tense of (1) and (lA), he makes a category mistake. (1) and (lA) are not 
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sentences, they are propositions, so they can't be tensed. 
Craig has an argument for thinking that I must be thinking of (1) and 
(IA) as sentences. He says that I hold that propositions "lack indexicality," 
whereas (1) is formulated using the word 'now'. Of course I hold that 
propositions lack in.dexicality. Anyone who distinguishes between sen-
tences and propositions will hold the same, for indexicals are linguistic 
items, and as such, constituents of sentences, not propositions. 
This response does little to clarify the theory I hold or how the relation-
ship between (1) and (IN) helps to show how it is possible for an eternal 
God to be omniscient in the face of the temporality of the world. So let me 
explain. 
1 assume, as already noted, that propositions are the objects of knowl-
edge, and there are two importantly different theories of propositions. 
According to one theory, propositions are simply true or false; there is no 
such thing as a proposition that is true at one time and false at another. 
The other theory allows propositions to vary in truth value over time. I 
adopt the first kind of theory, holding that a proposition, if true at any 
time, is true at all times. Craig's argument is not directed at the theory of 
propositions I endorse, so I will not enter into any defense of the view here. 
I also distinguish between sentences and propositions, as also already 
noted, the former being linguistic items spoken or written which express 
the latter (when things go well semantically). So there is a difference 
between the sentence 'We are now in the year 2000 A.D.' and the proposi-
tion We are now in the year 2000 A.D., and difference which I will indicate 
by the practices just used of single quotes and bolded ita lics. 
We can ask further questions about the nature of propositions, and the 
connection between sentences and propositions. Propositions are struc-
turally complex, made up of metaphysical items which are the semantic 
values of the sentences used to express those propositions. When things 
go well for language, a sentence plus its meaning plus the context in ques-
tion yields a single proposition as the semantic value of that sentence; 
when things do not go well, no such mapping exists. Things do not go 
well when the sentence is ambiguous, ill-formed, etc. Craig's argument 
does not involve some slippage between sentence and proposition 
expressed, so the aspect of the theory of expression concerned with what 
happens when things do not go well are not important here. 
Consider what happens when things go well, however. We have a sim-
ple sentence 
'John runs' 
which, on a particular occasion of use, expresses the proposition 
John runs. 
I must note that the token formulation here is not intended to reveal the 
semantic structure of the proposition in question. I only use the token for-
mulation as I do to signal the intimate connection between the proposition 
expressed and the linguistic structure of the sentence which expresses it. As 
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a result, nothing can be inferred about the structure of the proposition from 
the token formulation I give of it. Moreover, another occurrence of that 
same token formulation need not represent that same proposition. So if 
there are two people named 'John' and someone asserts the same sentence 
above, I would use the same formulation of the proposition expressed as 
used above. But no one should infer that two tokens of the same type of 
formulation implies that I'm referring to the same proposition. 
So if my manner of specifying the proposition in question above does 
nothing to reveal its structure, more work needs to be done. The particular 
structure of the proposition in question obtains in virtue of the semantic 
values of the terms of the sentence on the particular occasion of use. So, 
consider the following proposition 
The semantic value of 'John' in the sentence 'John runs' has the prop-
erty of running, which is the semantic value of the predicate of that 
same sentence. 
Further, suppose that the semantic value of 'John' is some property which 
is the essence of John. Then we have the further proposition 
The property which is the essence of John is mutually exemplified 
with the property of running. 
If the semantic theory just employed is correct, then some sort of identi-
fication can be made between these three propositions. Just what kind of 
identification, I do not know. At the very least, the three propositions are 
necessarily equivalent, but the more interesting question is whether they 
are analytically equivalent to each other, or whether they are identical to 
each other. I hold no theory about that question, though I think it is a very 
interesting one. It is an interesting and deep question about semantic theo-
ry itself, about whether a proposition describing the semantic operations 
on elements of a sentence can be identical to the proposition expressed by 
that very sentence. Frege struggled with such a question, finding himself 
in the awkward position of claiming that the concept horse is not a concept. 
So my primary aim is not to solve problems such as the above about the 
relationship between propositions and correct applications of a correct 
semantical theory. The only viewpoint I maintain about the relationship 
between the three propositions above is that the tense of the sentence used 
to express such the original proposition John runs is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of the relationship between the three propositions. Whether the third 
proposition above is an accurate characterization of the constituents of the 
first is not dependent on issues of tense at all. What is important is that the 
second and third propositions are semantic elucidations of the first, telling 
us what metaphysical reality must be like for it to be true. In order for the 
semantic theory to be successful, it must correctly elucidate the con-
stituents of the proposition in such a way that the proposition is true at all 
times if true at all. If it does so, then any worries about the tense of the sen-
tence that expresses the proposition in question ought to disappear. 
Similar remarks apply when the example is changed to one 
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involving indexicals. For example, suppose on a particular occasion, I utter 
'I am tired', 
which expresses, on that occasion of use, the proposition 
I am tired. 
The assumed semantical treatment of the sentence used on that occasion 
yields 
The semantic value of 'I' in the sentence 'I am tired" has the property 
of being tired, such property being the semantic value of the predicate 
of said sentence. 
If we adopt a semantical theory according to which the semantic value of 
first-person indexicals is the essence of the speaker, the semantic theory 
yields 
The essence of Jon Kvanvig is co-exemplified with the property of 
being tired. 
Once again, no issue of tense arises here, even though the sentence used to 
express the propositions in question is a present tense sentence. What matters, 
to repeat, is the adequacy of the semantical theory that proposes the second 
and third propositions as semantic elucidations of the first. That theory must 
delineate the constituents of the proposition I am tired in such a way that the 
proposition is true at all times if true at all. If the theory is able to do so, then 
worries about indexicals for the theory of propositions I hold disappear. 
One may complain that the propositions in question are not fully repre-
sented, because they fail to specify the time at which I am tired, and one may 
choose to expand the example to accommodate this desire for full represen-
tation. We may do so by considering what is expressed by the sentence 
'I am now tired'. 
It is the proposition 
I am now tired. 
Using the same treatment outlined above, our semantica I theory yields 
The semantic value of 'I' in the sentence 'I am tired" has the property 
of being tired now, such property being the semantic value of the 
predicate of said sentence. 
If we adopt a semantical theory according to which the semantic value of 
first-person indexicals is the essence of the speaker, the semantic theory 
yields 
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The essence of Jon Kvanvig is co-exemplified with the property of 
being tired now. 
We may inquire further into the constitution of the property in question, 
the property being tired now. Since our propositions are true at all times if 
true at all, we should adopt a semantical theory that treats this property as 
complex, composed out of the property of being tired and some appropri-
ate semantical treahnent of the term 'now' as used in the sentence above. 
By analogy with the treatment of the indexical T, we can adopt a theory 
which makes the semantic value of 'now' the essence of the moment of 
utterance of the sentence containing it. Such a treatment makes the proper-
ty being tired now a complex entity composed of the property of being 
tired together with the essence of the time of utterance. Such a theory pre-
sumably would treat the entire proposition as involving the two-place rela-
tion being tired with the essence of Jon Kvanvig and the essence of the time 
of utterance as its two relata. 
I stress again that issues of tense play no role in such a theory. At the 
risk of boring the reader, what is at issue is the semantical theory which 
posits certain semantic elucidations of propositions expressed by tensed 
sentences involving indexicals. Should there be no such adequate theory 
of semantic constitution for handling issues of tense and temporal indexi-
cality, then the theory of propositions presupposed must be abandoned 
and some other approach would be needed to reconcile God's eternity and 
omniscience. If no such objection is forthcoming, then the semantical theo-
ry in question gives some grounds for thinking that eternity and omni-
science are not incompatible. For the theory in question purportedly delin-
eates the constituents of the proposition I am now tired in such a way that 
this proposition is true at all times if true at all, and hence worries for the 
theory of propositions that I hold based on considerations of indexicality 
and temporal indexicality in language disappear. 
This theory is not a complete theory of propositional attitudes, for it can-
not explain the difference, for example, between de se and de re belief.' In 
order to complete the account of propositional attitudes, a third relata must 
be included in addition to the person and the proposition in question, what 
we might refer to as a way of accessing, or a mode of presentation, of the 
proposition in question. According to this theory, the difference between 
de se and de re beliefs that have the same propositional content is found in 
the way of accessing that content. Similarly, the difference between a tem-
poral knowing that it is now noon and an atemporal knowing of that same 
propositional content is found in the way of accessing that content. I will 
not pursue the details of the theory here any further, since Craig's objection 
to my theory does not concern this third element of propositional attitudes, 
but focuses instead on the propositions involved. I turn then to that objec-
tion. 
Craig's central point is contained in the following passage: "But (IA) is 
true only if the "is" in (IA) is tense less. Otherwise (IA) is false, having 
been true only on 1 June 1984. If (IA) is tensed, the time of its truth is just 
the same as that of (1)."3 
Again, I must insist that matters of tense have nothing to do with the 
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issue. What is relevant is whether the propositions in question are true 
simpliciter, or whether they vary in truth value from one time to another. 
Craig believes that (1) does so vary, and hence that (1 A) must also so vary 
in order to identified with (1). But why does Craig think that (1) changes 
truth value across time? As far as I can tell, the only reason would be 
because the sentence which expresses (1) expresses a truth at some times 
but not at others. But (1) is not a sentence; it is a proposition. So properties 
possessed by the sentence that expresses it on a particular occasion of use 
should not automatically be thought to be properties of (1) itself. 
Craig might claim perplexity at this point: how could (1) be a proposition 
of the sort consistent with the view of propositions I hold, i.e., how could (1) 
be a proposition that is true simpliciter? The answer is this: that is the point 
of employing the semantic theory which generates (1 A') as the semantic 
elucidation of the structure of proposition (1). (1A') tells us what are the 
metaphysical constituents of (1), thereby revealing how (1) can be true sim-
pliciter. One gets confused about what my theory is proposing by failing to 
distinguish (1) from the sentence which expresses it, and failing to note 
that (1A') is the semantic elucidation of what is involved in (l)'s being true 
at all times (and also by failing to recognize that other tokens of 'It is now 1 
June 1984' need not specify the very proposition under discussion, for the 
proposition under discussion is that one with the constituents elucidated 
by (IA')). Without the semantic elucidation, it would be mysterious 
indeed to claim that (1) is true at all times, since the terminology used to 
formulate it certainly looks like the kind of terminology that would be 
used to express a claim that is true at some times but not at others. But 
with the elucidation, any objection to this attempt to reconcile eternity and 
omniscience must claim that the semantic theory is problematic. It is inter-
esting to note that Craig does not do that. 
1 wish to urge some caution about how successful a reconciliation I take 
this to be. First, I don't believe there is a lot at stake here, because I, along 
with Craig, do not think the doctrine of the eternity of God is well-motivat-
ed. Furthermore, I am not convinced that moments of time have essences. 
It could be that moments of time are purely relational, having no identity 
in themselves other than the place they hold in the temporal sequence, or, 
more radically, it could be that the concept of an essence is simply incoher-
ent. I know of no demonstration of either of these possibilities, however, 
and in the absence of such an argument, the above approach suggests that 
eternity and omniscience are compatible. 
One other item remains, for the approach I cite applies only to sentences 
containing indexicals and not to tensed sentences generally. But it is not 
hard to extend the treatment to apply more generally. Some claims about 
the past and future involve demonstratives such as 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 
'one week hence', etc. 1 would propose to treat these similarly to the indexi-
cal 'now': what is expressed is the essence of the moment referred to. 
Besides these kinds of sentences, there are past and future tense sentences, 
which can be treated as quantifications over times that have the properties 
of having existed in the past or future, respectively. That leaves the present 
tense sentences as the difficult case, but I see no impediment to holding that 
a present tense sentence such as 'T am tired' expresses the same proposition 
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as the sentence 'I am now tired'. I am sure there are complexities to be 
addressed, such as problems about tenses that siS'11al continuous action in 
the past, present, or future, but I see no reason to think that any such prob-
lems would be insurmountable. If that is correct, then the treatment of tem-
poral indexicals outlined above can be extended to show how to reconcile 
temporality in all its aspects with the omniscience of an eternal God. 
So, in short, Craig's objection is an objection to a theory quite different 
from the one I defend. Perhaps there are reasons to abandon the approach 
I suggest, and if so, I side with Craig by retaining the doctrine of omni-
science and abandoning the doctrine of eternity. Still, abandoning the lat-
ter doctrine would be premature at this point, since Craig's worries about 
co-tenability do not extend to the account of such outlined here. 
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